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Abstract
A key component of task preparation may be to anticipate the consequences of task-appropriate actions. This task
switching study examined whether such type of ‘‘intentional’’ preparatory control relies on the presentation of explicit
action effects. Preparatory BOLD activation in a condition with task-speciﬁc motion effect feedback was compared to
identical task conditions with accuracy feedback only. Switch-related activation was found selectively in the effect
feedback condition in themiddlemid-frontal gyrus and in the anterior intraparietal sulcus. Consistent with research on
attentional control, the posterior superior parietal lobule exhibited switch-related preparatory activation irrespective of
feedback type. To conclude, preparatory control can occur via complementary attentional and intentional neural
mechanisms depending on whether meaningful task-speciﬁc action effects lead to the formation of explicit effect
representations.
Descriptors: Action selection, Action effects, Attention, Cognitive control, Task switching
In almost any given situation, there are multiple different pos-
sibleways to interactwith the environment. Thus, actions have to
be selected by choosing one out of the available options. Two
control processes appear to govern this selective interaction be-
tween agent and environment. First, attentional control processes
serve as a perceptual ﬁlter that can constrain the selection of
actions to those most strongly associated with the currently rel-
evant stimulus dimension or feature. Second, intentional control
processes can constrain the selection of actions in terms of the
effects that will result from them. In other words, the conceptual
distinction between attention and intention made here is tightly
related to the fundamental distinction between (a) actions di-
rectly speciﬁed by the appropriate antecedent stimulus condi-
tions as mediated by stimulus–response associations and (b)
actions speciﬁed by their anticipated consequences as mediated
by response–effect associations (de Wit & Dickinson, 2009;
Dickinson, 1985; Hommel, Musseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz,
2001; Waszak et al., 2005). The basic design of the present study
rests on previous research using the task switching paradigm, an
experimental approach that is particularly well suited to creating
consistently high demands on both selective attention and selec-
tive intention as deﬁned above and elaborated further below.
Our central objective was to isolate brain areas involved in
preparatory intentional control processes that serve to disambigu-
ate actions associated with task-ambiguous ‘‘meanings’’ in the
sense that they entail different consequences (i.e. they are used for
different purposes) depending on the current task context. We
were interested in this particular issue for two reasons. First, al-
though the issue of preparatory intentional controlmay be central
to understanding human goal-directed behavior, it has not yet
been examined extensively using neuroimaging methods. Second,
and more speciﬁcally, existing research suggests that preparatory
control during task switching is solely attentional in nature, at
least when concrete target stimuli are not yet available (Brass et
al., 2003; Meiran, 2000; Ruge et al., 2005; Ruge, Braver, & Me-
iran, 2009). The current study challenges this general conclusion
by postulating that task preparation might also operate at the
level of intentional action representations, but only when the in-
volved action effects aremade sufﬁciently salient to engage amore
explicit internal representation of task-speciﬁc effects.
We examined this hypothesis by use of a modiﬁed version of a
spatial task switching paradigm. In the original design (Meiran,
1996), participants had to switch between two spatial discrim-
ination tasks regarding a target stimulus that appeared unpre-
dictably in one out of four positions within a 2  2 grid. One
task required judgment regarding the horizontal position of the
target (left or right within the grid) whereas the alternative task
required judgment regarding the vertical position of the target
(up or downwithin the grid). In this situation, attentional control
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is thought to be relevant for selectively activating the stimulus–
response associations that are appropriate in the current task.
For instance, if the target appears in the upper-left position of the
grid and the task is to make a horizontal judgment, spatial
attentional mechanisms focus perceptual processing on the hor-
izontal position of the stimulus, so that it is this dimension that
triggers the (preexperimentally) associated response, rather than
the vertical dimension.
One advantage of this paradigm is that it has been used to not
only demonstrate the role of attentional control mechanisms
during task-switching but also to show that intentional control
mechanisms can play a role in response selection and execution as
well. Speciﬁcally, the relevance of intentional action representa-
tions has been revealed by contrasting two conditions that
differed with regard to the presence of task-related ambiguity on
the level of response meanings (Meiran, 2000). In the ambiguous
condition, the same responses were used in both tasks (i.e., left
and down stimulus positions both required a left button press
response and right and up stimulus positions both required a
right button press response). Such a mapping of four stimulus
positions onto two responses implies that a given response, for
example, a right button press, is ambiguously associated with
two task-dependent intentions: Either it can be used to achieve
the goal of indicating ‘‘right’’ or it can be used to achieve the goal
of indicating ‘‘up.’’ In contrast, the nonambiguous conditionwas
characterized by a unique one-to-one mapping between the four
stimulus positions and four distinct responses. Thus, each re-
sponse was unambiguously associated with one distinct inten-
tion. Importantly, it has been shown that response ambiguity is
associated with speciﬁc behavioral performance costs (Meiran,
2000) as well as with neuroanatomically speciﬁc brain activations
within the lateral prefrontal cortex (Brass et al., 2003). Yet, in
these previous studies, it was assumed that task-speciﬁc
disambiguation of response meanings only occurs after presen-
tation of the target stimulus and not during the preparation pe-
riod (in which the upcoming task is known, but the target has not
yet appeared).
The primary hypothesis of the present study is that task-re-
lated disambiguation of response meanings (i.e., intentional con-
trol) can occur during preparatory as well as target (imperative)
periods. However, intentional action representations might only
be engaged for preparatory purposes under conditions in which
the meaning of actions are made sufﬁciently salient. We reasoned
that one way to increase salience would be to have task responses
result in task-speciﬁc and highly plausible perceptual effects. To
this end, we modiﬁed the task so that correct responses were
immediately followed by perceptual motion effects in the direc-
tion of the intended target location (cf. Ansorge, 2002; Kiesel &
Hoffmann, 2004). We expected that this coupling of responses
with a salient and plausible perceptual effect would lead to a
stronger and more explicit action–effect associative representa-
tion to be formed. Moreover, if action effects were task unique
(i.e., upward/downward motions only occurred during the ver-
tical task, and leftward/rightward motions only occurred during
the horizontal task), they could be invoked during the prepar-
atory period as a means of reducing interference related to the
otherwise task-ambiguous responses (i.e., because the same two
responses were used in both tasks). To enable the formation of
such unique associations between motion effects and respective
tasks, the original spatial target arrangement was slightly mod-
iﬁed. For instance, instead of presenting one target square in the
upper-left corner of the grid, two target squares were presented,
one left and one up (see Figure 1). After a correct response was
made, a central red square appeared to ‘‘jump’’ to the task-ap-
propriate square indicated by the response (e.g., for the hori-
zontal task the central square would jump to the left target square
position).
To directly test our hypothesis, we compared preparatory
brain activation in the novel ‘‘effect feedback’’ condition with
preparatory brain activation in the standard control condition
presenting ‘‘accuracy feedback’’ only. Critically, both conditions
were physically identical until after response execution. Thus,
differences in preparatory brain activation can unambiguously
be attributed to strategy differences during task preparation. On
the basis of prior research, we expected that two brain regions
within lateral prefrontal and parietal cortexFthe anterior intra-
parietal sulcus (aIPS) and the middle mid-frontal gyrus
(mMFG)Fwould show selective involvement in preparatory
intentional control (i.e., increased activity in the effect feedback
relative to accuracy feedback conditions). These two regions
have been implicated in intentional control processes under ac-
curacy feedback conditions (Brass et al., 2003), but only when
concrete target stimuli were present (i.e., when concrete actions
can be planned) and not when advance task information was
available for preparation (Ruge et al., 2005, 2009). In contrast to
these previous results, we hypothesized that under effect feed-
back conditions, aIPS and mMFG should be engaged even dur-
ing the preparation period, before actual task implementation
(i.e., active prior to target presentation).
Furthermore, we hypothesized that brain regions involved in
preparatory attentional control (i.e., selecting the task-appropri-
ate stimulus dimension) should be similarly engaged in both
feedback conditions (because there was no difference between
conditions with regard to the upcoming target stimuli). Such
attentional control regions were expected to be located most
prominently in the posterior superior parietal lobule (pSPL;
Wager, Jonides, & Reading, 2004).
Finally, we were also interested in evaluating the impact of
feedback type on behavioral performance. In particular, the the-
oretical considerations outlined above directly imply the predic-
tion that advance task preparation involving the usage of task-
speciﬁc action effect representations in the effect feedback con-
dition should reduce, if not eliminate, residual switch cost as
2 H. Ruge et al.
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Figure 1 Experimental design. Participants performed two blocked task
switching conditions involving either ‘‘accuracy feedback’’ or ‘‘effect
feedback’’ after responding. On each trial the currently relevant task was
indicated by a centrally displayed task cue (‘‘H’’ for horizontal
discrimination and ‘‘V’’ for vertical discrimination). For further details,
see the Methods.
Q1
PSYP 01027
(B
W
US
 PS
YP
 01
02
7 W
eb
pd
f:=
04
/17
/20
10
 09
:59
:15
 46
63
55
 B
yte
s 9
 PA
GE
S n
 op
era
tor
=m
k.g
ok
ula
) 4
/17
/20
10
 9:
59
:40
 PM
compared to the standard accuracy feedback condition (Meiran,
2000).
Methods
Participants
Eighteen human participants took part in the functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) study (mean age5 22 years; age
range: 19–29 years; 12 women, 6 men). An additional 30 par-
ticipants (mean age5 23 years; age range 20–31 years; 18
women, 12 men) were recruited to perform the behavioral task,
but outside of the scanner. All participants gave written informed
consent prior to taking part in the experiment.
Experimental Design: fMRI Study
The fMRI experiment consisted of two different blocked task
switching conditions, including (a) a standard control condition
in which responses were followed by accuracy feedback and (b) a
novel condition designed to increase the salience of task-speciﬁc
response meanings by presenting task-dependent motion effect
feedback. The order of blocks was counterbalanced across par-
ticipants. In each condition, a practice block of 20 trials was
performed before the experimental block started. Except for the
use of different types of response feedback, the two blocked
conditions were identical in terms of performance demands, as
described next. On each trial, participants were presented with a
task-ambiguous target stimulus comprised of two empty squares,
one located on the horizontal axis of a 2  2 grid and the other
one located on the vertical axis (for an exemplary target, see
Figure 1). Participants had to indicate the position of only one of
these squares, depending on whether they were instructed to
perform a horizontal or a vertical discrimination task. In the
horizontal discrimination task participants had to indicate
whether the target square located on the horizontal axis ap-
peared to the left or right of center by responding with the left or
right index ﬁnger, respectively. In the vertical discrimination task
participants had to indicate whether the target square located on
the vertical axis appeared above or below center by responding
with the left or right index ﬁnger, respectively. Importantly,
within this setup the same twomanual responses were involved in
both tasks; thus, response meanings (i.e., intentional action rep-
resentations) were task ambiguous. The currently relevant task
was indicated by a task cue displayed at the beginning of each
trial (‘‘H’’ for horizontal task; ‘‘V’’ for vertical task; centrally
displayed on a red square). The two tasks occurred in a pseu-
dorandom and unpredictable sequence, constrained so that the
number of task switch trials and task repetition trials was equal.
Task sequences were generated using the SeqGen2008 algorithm
(Remillard, 2008) so that the number of task switch trials and
task repetition trials was equal. The preparation interval between
task cue and target stimulus (CTI) varied randomly between 2.5 s
and 3.75 s. The task cue remained on screen during the entire
preparation interval. Participants had to respond within a win-
dow of 1.25 s. Following a response, feedback was displayed
immediately for 700 ms.
In the accuracy feedback condition, in case of a correct re-
sponse the central red square turned green, and a check symbol
was superimposed. In case of an incorrect or late response, the
central red square remained red, and an ‘‘X’’ was superimposed.
In the motion effect feedback condition, in case of a correct
response, the central red square disappeared and then reappeared
in one of the two peripheral target squares according to the cur-
rently relevant task (see Figure 1 for an example). Perceptually,
these actions gave the appearance of the red square ‘‘jumping’’ to
the location indicated by the participant’s response. In case of an
incorrect or late response, the central red square remained sta-
tionary with an ‘‘X’’ superimposed. Thus, the only difference
between the two conditions was the nature of postresponse feed-
back on correct response trials. The intertrial interval varied be-
tween 2.5 s and 12.0 s, with exponentially decreasing probability
of longer intervals (Hagberg, Zito, Patria, & Sanes, 2001). The
actual trial onset was randomly jittered by TR/2 (i.e., 1.25 s)
relative to the start of fMRI acquisition cycles to double the
sampling rate of the trial-related BOLD response (Josephs,
Turner, & Friston, 1997).
Because the study aimed at comparing preparatory brain ac-
tivation in the context of accuracy feedback versus motion-effect
feedback, we included partial cue-only trials to decorrelate cue-
related and target-related BOLD activation components. There-
by, wewere able to obtain separate BOLD response estimates for
cue-related and target-related activation (Ollinger, Shulman, &
Corbetta, 2001; Shulman et al., 1999). Note that the target-
related BOLD response estimate also comprises possible activa-
tion components elicited by the response or by the feedback. Yet,
because we were speciﬁcally interested in cue-related preparatory
brain activation, disentangling these target-related BOLD
response subcomponents was not important, here. Each blocked
condition comprised 144 trials, including 96 full cue–target trials
and 48 partial cue-only trials. Because responses were only to be
made following the target, S1-only trials had no associated task
response. The order of condition blocks was counterbalanced
across participants.
Experimental Design: Behavioral Pilot Study
Because the fMRI experiment comprised only 18 participants
and the expected behavioral effects are rather weak (i.e., residual
switch cost following task preparation), we decided to increase
statistical power by also including data from an additional 30
participants who performed the behavioral task outside of the
scanner. The task design was the same as that for the scanned
participants except for the following differences in procedure.
First, there was one short CTI of 100 ms and one long CTI of
1500 ms, instead of two long CTIs of 2500 ms and 3750 ms as
realized in the fMRI experiment. Thus, different from the fMRI
study in which there was always sufﬁcient time to prepare for the
upcoming task, the 100-ms CTI condition prevented participants
from full advance task preparation. Thus, we used only the trials
with the 1500-ms CTI for analysis. Second, there was a constant
intertrial interval of only 300 ms instead of a jittered ITI. Third,
there were no partial cue-only trials. Fourth, in the standard
feedback condition, the correct–incorrect feedback was provided
by presenting the written German words for ‘‘correct’’ and ‘‘in-
correct’’ in the center of the screen instead of symbols. Fifth, the
pilot experiment was controlled by the ERTS software (BeriSoft)
instead of Eprime 1.2. The participants completed 170 trials in
each feedback condition, and the order of feedback blocks was
counterbalanced across subjects.
Imaging Procedure
Whole-brain images were acquired on a Siemens 3 Tesla whole-
body Trio System (Erlangen, Germany) with a 16-channel cir-
cularly polarized head coil. Headphones dampened scanner noise
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and enabled communication with the participants. Both struc-
tural and functional images were acquired for each participant.
Structural images (1.25 mm  1 mm  1 mm) were acquired
using an MP-RAGE T1-weighted sequence (TR5 9.7 ms,
TE5 4 ms, ﬂip5 121, TI5 300 ms). Functional images were
acquired using a gradient echo planar sequence (TR5 2500 ms,
TE5 30 ms, ﬂip5 901, interleaved slice acquisition, slice
gap5 0). Each volume contained thirty-two 4.0-mm-thick slices
(in-plane resolution 3.0 mm  3.0 mm).
Participants performed a total of eight functional scanning
runs, which were separated into two blocks of four runs of each
blocked condition (accuracy feedback, motion effect feedback).
Each scanning run consisted of 36 trials (in total 144 trials per
blocked condition) and lasted approximately 6 min. The exper-
iment was controlled by Eprime 1.2 software (Psychology Soft-
ware Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA) running on aWindows-XPPC.
Stimuli were projected to participants via Visuastim digital gog-
gles (Resonance Technology, Inc., Northridge, CA) simulating a
viewing distance of 100 cm. A ﬁber-optic, light-sensitive key
press was used to record participants’ behavioral responses.
Data Analysis
Preprocessing. The empirical data set was analyzed with
SPM5 running underMATLAB 7.1. The preprocessing included
slice-time correction, rigid body movement correction (three
translation and three rotation parameters), normalization of the
functional images by directly registering the mean functional
image to the standard MNI EPI template image provided by
SPM5 (the resulting interpolated spatial resolution was 3  3
 3 mm), and smoothing of the functional images (Gaussian
Kernel, FWHM5 8 mm).
Event-related analysis. The preprocessed imaging data were
analyzed using the General Linear Model (GLM) approach as
implemented in the SPM5 software package. Model regressors
were created by convolving neural input functions for the differ-
ent event types with the assumed canonical hemodynamic re-
sponse function used by SPM5, including both derivatives. For
each condition block, the GLM included two regressors for cue-
related activation separately for task switch and task repetition
trials and two regressors for target-related activation separately
for task switch and task repetition trials. Thus, a total of eight
event-related BOLD responses were to be estimated (plus re-
gressors for the two derivatives). The actual data analysis focused
on the four cue-related BOLD estimates (cue–repeat [accuracy
feedback], cue–switch [accuracy feedback], cue–repeat [effect
feedback], and cue–switch [effect feedback]). These four BOLD
estimates were used to compute two whole-brain images that
captured the patterns of preparatory brain activation associated
with either attentional control or intentional control. Preparatory
control demands were expected to be especially high in task
switch trials as compared to task repetition trials, reﬂecting en-
hanced reconﬁguration demands due to proactive interference
resulting from implementing the alternative task in the previous
trial. Although results from previous fMRI studies on task
switching are rather heterogeneous with regard to enhanced
switch-related preparatory BOLD activation, we nevertheless
focused our primary analysis on this switchrepetition contrast
because it allows for a more speciﬁc interpretation in terms of
task-related preparatory disambiguation processes. Further-
more, from a methodological point of view, by comparing rel-
ative BOLD activation differences (switch vs. repeat) across the
two blocked conditions (accuracy vs. effect feedback), we could
circumvent the potential problem that baseline differences be-
tween blocks (resulting from differential activation during the
intertrial interval) might cause apparent differences between
conditions that are unrelated to the relevant preparatory pro-
cesses within the trial itself.
Intentional preparatory control, that is, the advance activa-
tion of the currently task-relevant response meanings, was hy-
pothesized to be involved speciﬁcally in the motion effect
feedback condition. We therefore expected enhanced prepara-
tory BOLD activation for switch trials as compared to repetition
trials, especially in the effect-feedback condition. Thus, we spe-
ciﬁcally isolated voxels that exhibited enhanced switch-related
preparatory activation in the effect feedback conditionmore than
in the accuracy feedback condition. To this end, we used a two-
stage procedure in which voxels were ﬁrst identiﬁed at the group
level based on the the switchrepetition contrast for the effect
feedback condition with po.001 and a minimum of 30 contig-
uous above threshold voxels. Next, voxel clusters were only in-
cluded for further analysis if switch-related activity in the effect
feedback condition was signiﬁcantly greater than that in the ac-
curacy feedback condition. This constraint was imposed by ap-
plying an inclusive mask based on the interaction contrast
([switch repetition] effect feedback [switch repetition] ac-
curacy feedback) with an intermediate threshold of po.01.
In contrast to intentional preparatory control, preparatory
attentional control, that is, the advance activation of the cur-
rently task-relevant perceptual dimension, was expected for both
feedback conditions. Thus, we speciﬁcally isolated voxels that
exhibited enhanced switch-related preparatory activation irre-
spective of the feedback condition. To this end, we again used a
two-stage masking procedure. First, voxels were identiﬁed based
on the switchrepetition contrast collapsed across both feedback
conditions with po.001 and a minimum of 30 contiguous above
threshold voxels. Second, voxel clusters were only included for
further analysis if there was no effect of feedback condition. This
constraint was imposed by applying an exclusive mask based on
the same interaction contrast used above. This masking proce-
dure effectively excluded voxels for which the switch – repetition
difference was modulated by the type of feedback using a very
lenient whole-brain threshold of po.05, so that voxels showing
even subtle effects of feedback type were masked out.
The minimum of 30 contiguous above threshold voxels was
chosen arbitrarily, after considering (a) the objectively deﬁned
cluster size threshold of 44 contiguous voxels as determined
based on Gaussian Random Field theory implemented within
SPM5 and (b) the often much more lenient, but rather subjec-
tively deﬁned, cluster sizes found in the literature. In order not to
ignore potentially relevant activation clusters comprising less
than 44 contiguously activated voxels, we arbitrarily lowered the
threshold down to 30. When reporting the fMRI results (Table 1
and Table 2), we explicitly indicate the clusters that did not reach
the objectively deﬁned 44 voxel threshold.
Results
Behavioral Performance Data
As described above in the experimental design section, in addi-
tion to the behavioral data obtained from the 18 fMRI partic-
ipants, we also included data from additional 30 subjects who
performed the task under unscanned conditions in order to
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increase statistical power for identifying relevant behavioral
effects of feedback type. Mean response times (RT) and error
rates of each subject were entered into two separate four-way
analyses of variance (ANOVAs). These ANOVAs included the
two factors of primary interest, that is, task transition (task rep-
etition vs. task switch) and feedback type (accuracy vs. effect). To
check for possible modulatory effects we included the two ad-
ditional factors response congruency (the two target squares as-
sociated with either the same response or different responses
depending on task) and response transition (same vs. different
response as compared to preceding trial).
The analysis of response times revealed a signiﬁcant main
effect of task transition, F(1,47)5 16.69, po.001, reﬂecting the
standard residual task-switch cost. More importantly, there was
also a signiﬁcant interaction effect of Task Transition  Feed-
back Type, F(1,47)5 4.30, po.05, reﬂecting slightly larger re-
sidual switch cost for the accuracy feedback condition
(repeat5 496 ms; switch5 512 ms) relative to the effect feed-
back condition (repeat5 502 ms; switch5 508 ms). The main
effect of feedback type failed to reach signiﬁcance,
F(1,47)5 0.02, n.s.). Follow-up tests revealed that residual
switch cost in the accuracy feedback condition were highly sig-
niﬁcant, F(1,47)5 24.34, po.001, whereas the residual switch
cost in the effect feedback condition failed to reach signiﬁcance,
F(1,47)5 2.40, n.s. This ﬁnding conﬁrms the prediction that the
presentation of effect feedback would encourage the advance
activation of task-speciﬁc action effect representations and, thus,
reduce residual switch cost. This effect was not signiﬁcantly
modulated by response congruency or response transition. Also,
there were no such signiﬁcant effects regarding error rates (over-
all error rate was 4%).
Notably, the Task Transition  Feedback Type interaction
effect failed to reach signiﬁcance when evaluated separately for
each the two experiments (pilot and fMRI). Yet, importantly, the
relevant RT pattern was numerically similar for both experi-
ments. Speciﬁcally, in the pilot experiment the residual switch
cost was reduced from 18 ms in the accuracy feedback condition
to 8 ms in the effect feedback condition. Similarly, in the fMRI
experiment, the residual switch cost was reduced from 12 ms in
the accuracy feedback condition to 3 ms in the effect feedback
condition. These descriptive results indicate that the fMRI-re-
latedmodiﬁcations of the experimental procedure did not alter in
a qualitative way the cognitive processes of interest (as reﬂected
by response times).
Imaging Data
Figure 2 depicts (in yellow) regions exhibiting an activation pat-
tern consistent with intentional preparatory control, that is,
stronger switch-related preparatory activation in the effect feed-
back condition compared to the standard accuracy feedback
condition (see Table 1). As predicted, we found activation clus-
ters in the aIPS bilaterally and in the left mMFG. A homologous
right mMFG activation cluster comprised only 18 out of the 30
required contiguous above threshold voxels (peak voxel MNI
coordinates are 36, 36, and 33; z5 3.42). Additionally, we found
activation clusters including the dorsal premotor cortex (dPMC),
the posterior portion of the anterior cingulate cortex (pACC),
and regions within the occipital cortex.
An important follow-up question concerning this effect-feed-
back-speciﬁc activation pattern is whether it is inﬂuenced by the
order of condition blocks. In particular, one might suspect that
participants who performed the accuracy feedback block ﬁrst
might be less inclined to engage in intentional preparation in the
subsequent effect feedback block as compared to participants
who started with the effect feedback block. Yet, as Figure 3
shows for two representative brain regions, none of the previ-
ously indentiﬁed intention-related brain regions was modulated
by the order of condition blocks.
We also found voxels (Figure 2, colored in pink) that exhib-
ited an activation pattern consistent with attentional preparatory
control, that is, switch-related preparatory activation not affected
by feedback type (see Table 2). As predicted, we found activation
clusters in the pSPL and in the pre-SMA. Additionally, we found
activation in the occipital cortex.
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to identify brain areas speciﬁ-
cally involved in intention-based task preparation, that is, pre-
paratory control processes that serve to disambiguate task-
ambiguous action effect representations (i.e., ‘‘response mean-
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Table 1 Preparatory Intentional Task Control
Brain
region
MNI coordinate Statistics
x y Z
Switch4repetition for effect
feedback
z value Number of voxels
L mMFG  30 39 30 3.50 52
LpACC  6 18 45 4.31 48
L dPMC  39  6 51 5.04 58
L aIPS  51  27 45 4.18 159
R aIPS 48  27 54 4.29 284
L OCC  36  63  12 3.86 33a
L OCC  24  87  9 4.38 142
R OCC 39  60  9 4.33 338
R OCC 33  75 27 4.03 39a
Note: a: anterior, IPS: intra-parietal sulcus, L: left, m: mid, OCC occipital
cortex, p: posterior, MFG: middle frontal gyrus, PMC: premotor cortex,
R: right.
aDenotes regions that failed to reach the Gaussian random ﬁeld cluster
size threshold of 44 contiguously activated voxels, but reached a more
liberal threshold of 30 contiguous voxels.
Table 2 Preparatory Attentional Task Control
Brain
region
MNI coordinate Statistics
x y Z
Switch4repetition
irrespective of feedback type
z value Number of voxels
L aIFG  36 48 12 3.96 34a
Lpre-SMA  9 0 60 3.79 32a
L/R pSPL  15  72 39 3.98 541
 6  60 66 3.98
24  63 57 3.95
L OCC  6  75  6 4.42 48
Note: a: anterior, IFG: inferior frontal gyrus, L: left, OCC: occipital
cortex, p: posterior, R: right, SMA: supplementary motor area, SPL:
superior parietal lobule.
aDenotes regions that failed to reach the Gaussian random ﬁeld cluster
size threshold of 44 contiguously activated voxels, but reached a more
liberal threshold of 30 contiguous voxels.
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ings’’) prior to the presentation of concrete target stimuli that
trigger response selection and generation processes. We reasoned
that intentional preparatory task control is an optional process
that may preferentially occur when actions are immediately fol-
lowed by effects that are task-speciﬁc, plausible, and directly
perceivable. As explained in detail in the introduction, this is not
the case in standard task switching procedures involving only
accuracy feedback that is task nonspeciﬁc. Thus, we compared
this standard control condition with a novel condition in which
actions were followed by task-speciﬁc motion effects. Impor-
tantly, these two conditions were physically identical with regard
to the task cue, the preparation interval, and the target stimulus.
Thus, differences in preparatory (i.e., cue-related) brain activa-
tion could only be due to differences in themental representation
and anticipation of the upcoming response feedback.
Both, the behavioral performance results and the imaging
results conﬁrmed our hypothesis. First, the residual switch cost
(i.e., switch cost even after ample time to prepare for the current
task) was statistically eliminated in the effect feedback condition
(6 ms) and was signiﬁcantly reduced relative to the standard
accuracy feedback condition (16 ms). This ﬁnding nicely sup-
ports a hypothesis suggested earlier (Meiran, 2000), namely, that
a substantial portion of the residual switch cost under standard
accuracy feedback conditions might indeed be due to insufﬁ-
ciently prepared task-ambiguous response meanings (i.e., repre-
sentations of task-speciﬁc action effects). By contrast, when
response meanings are made sufﬁciently salient as in the present
effect feedback condition, task-ambiguous response meanings
seem to be disambiguated during the preparation interval, as
indicated by much smaller residual switch cost.
Although the performance data seem to reﬂect the impact of
intentional task preparation in terms of reduced residual switch
cost, the imaging data might directly reﬂect the upstream pre-
paratory disambiguation of response meanings, which entails the
reduced behavioral switch cost. Several brain regions exhibited
switch-related preparatory BOLD activation speciﬁcally in the
effect feedback condition but not in the standard accuracy feed-
back condition. Importantly, this included the predicted brain
areas within lateral prefrontal and parietal cortex: aIPS and
mMFG. Furthermore, our results conﬁrmed the role of other
fronto-parietal brain regions in attentional control, notably the
pSPL and pre-SMA. In line with such an interpretation, in the
present study, these regions exhibited switch-related preparatory
activation irrespective of the type of feedback.
Whereas the involvement of mMFG and aIPS in intentional
preparatory control was hypothesized, there were three addi-
tional brain regions that exhibited the same activation pattern
(pACC, dPMC, and occipital cortex) but were not expected from
the outset. Yet, from a broader perspective, the involvement of
these regions seems quite plausible. First, both pACCand dPMC
have been suggested to be related to action-related processes
6 H. Ruge et al.
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Figure 2 Two types of preparatory BOLD activation were identiﬁed,
associated either with ‘‘intentional preparatory control’’ processes
(stronger switch-related activation in the effect feedback condition than
in the accuracy feedback condition) colored in red/yellow or with
‘‘attentional preparatory control’’ processes (similar switch-related
activation for both feedback types) colored in blue/pink. The depicted
brain sections were created with SPM5 within MNI coordinate space.
Figure 3 Results of a follow-up analysis conﬁrming that effect-feedback-speciﬁc switch-related preparatory activationwas not inﬂuenced by the order of
blocks (i.e., effect feedback, then accuracy feedback vs. accuracy feedback, then effect feedback).
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rather than stimulus-directed (i.e., attentional) ones (Passing-
ham, 1995; Picard & Strick, 1996, 2001). Thus, if task prepa-
ration in the effect feedback condition really leads to the
activation of action codes via their associated effects, it seems
plausible that this also implicates the engagement of areas that
are involved in action planning processes on amore generic level.
Notably, there is evidence that speciﬁcally the pACC might be
related to the coding of actions with regard their consequences,
particularly the incentive values of action effects (Rushworth,
Buckley, Behrens, Walton, & Bannerman, 2007; Rushworth,
Walton, Kennerley, & Bannerman, 2004), suggesting that the
pACC might be involved in motivating the execution of actions.
Such a view suggests that the task-speciﬁc anticipation of action
effects, even when these do not involve explicit incentive value,
might nevertheless reﬂect a motivational drive to prepare the
currently task-appropriate response options, that is, coding the
task-appropriate set of responses with higher motivational pri-
ority than the task-inappropriate set of responses even before the
upcoming target stimulus enables the ultimate selection and ex-
ecution of one speciﬁc action.
Finally, the activation of visual cortex might be related to the
visual imagery of the anticipated motion effects. This latter as-
pect suggests an alternative explanation, namely, that what we
called ‘‘intentional preparatory control’’ might in fact be nothing
but visual imagery of the expected sensory events without any
connection to action-related processes. Yet, we believe that the
involvement of the other regions discussed above does, in fact,
strongly indicate the engagement of truly action-related prepar-
atory processes in the effect feedback condition as compared to
the accuracy feedback condition. Also, the ﬁnding that intention-
based preparation reduced behavioral switch cost speaks against
the interpretation that we are solely dealing with an epiphenom-
enon of pure visual expectation without any relationship to
action-related preparation. Otherwise, our experimental manip-
ulation should not have been expressed in the observed modu-
lation of behavioral performance. Of course, this does not
exclude the possibility that the activation observed in visual cor-
tex by itself might indeed be solely due to sensory (rather than
action) expectation.
It is worth noting that the observed preparatory effects were
characterized by increased activity on task-switch relative to
task-repeat trials. Such an activation pattern appears highly
plausible, as switch trials seem to demand stronger engagement
of cognitive control to overcome the task representations estab-
lished in the preceding trial. This argument holds for both at-
tentional control engagement with regard to ambiguous stimulus
representations and intentional control engagement with regard
to ambiguous response meanings. In line with such reasoning,
enhanced switch-related preparatory activation has consistently
been observed in event-related brain-electrical recordings (Kar-
ayanidis, Coltheart, Michie, & Murphy, 2003; Kieffaber & He-
trick, 2005; Rushworth, Hadland, Paus, & Sipila, 2002). By
contrast, event-related fMRI study results have been rather het-
erogeneous with regard to preparatory switch-related activation
effects (Badre & Wagner, 2006; Brass & von Cramon, 2002;
Braver, Reynolds, & Donaldson, 2003; Bunge, Kahn, Wallis,
Miller, &Wagner, 2003; Ruge et al., 2005; Wylie, Javitt, & Foxe,
2006; Yeung, Nystrom, Aronson, & Cohen, 2006). Yet, the
studies that do report signiﬁcant switch-related preparatory
BOLD activation have most reliably revealed effects in the pSPL
overlapping with the parietal cortex region associated with at-
tentional preparatory control in the present study and consistent
with the broader literature on ﬂexible attentional control (Wager
et al., 2004). As previous task switching studies used designs that
seem to rather discourage the engagement of intentional prepar-
atory control (no explicitly perceivable action effects), in the light
of the present results it does not seem surprising that those pre-
vious studies did not reliably report switch-related preparatory
activation in the aIPS and the mMFG (i.e., the regions that we
found to be speciﬁcally associated with intentional preparatory
control).
From a broader perspective, the involvement of aIPS and
mMFG in intentional preparatory control during task switching
is consistent with results from two conceptually related research
ﬁelds. First, studies examining action observation and imitation
processes, which tap into action planning processes triggered by
the observed action effects caused by other agents, typically dis-
cuss the aIPS as one important region (Arbib, 2005; Hamilton &
Grafton, 2006; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Second, the sig-
niﬁcance of the dorsolateral PFC (i.e., mMFG) has been em-
phasized in various types of paradigms involving nonroutine
action planning processes (Genovesio, Brasted, Mitz, & Wise,
2005; Pochon et al., 2001; Rowe, Toni, Josephs, Frackowiak, &
Passingham, 2000; Ruge et al., 2009), especially when actions are
‘‘freely’’ determined by participants without external selection
criteria (Frith, Friston, Liddle, & Frackowiak, 1991; Jahanshahi
& Dirnberger, 1999; Lau, Rogers, Ramnani, & Passingham,
2004).
The present study extends such previous ﬁndings by demon-
strating that the engagement of these regions (a) can be triggered
already during task preparation before the concrete target for
action is known, (b) is speciﬁcally linked to the availability of
explicit action effect information, and (c) preferentially occurs
when task-ambiguous action effect representations need to be
disambiguated (i.e., under task-switching conditions). Thus, the
mMFG and aIPS act together to disambiguate and select the
currently appropriate actions based on representations of action
goals as deﬁned in the original sense, that is, in terms of the
anticipated consequences expected to be achieved by acting in a
particular, currently appropriate way. Furthermore, the current
study extends and further clariﬁes the interpretation of results
from previous cued task-switching studies involving accuracy
feedback only (Brass et al., 2003; Ruge et al., 2009). These studies
revealed an enhanced engagement of mMFG, aIPS, or both re-
lated to target processing that was even demonstrated to occur in
a preparatory manner (Ruge et al., 2009), but when only accu-
racy feedback was available. These activations related to target
presentationwere also interpreted as reﬂecting intention-based as
compared to attention-based control. In the light of the present
study results, which imply mMFG and aIPS in intention-based
preparatory processes speciﬁcally in the effect feedback condi-
tion, it might appear unclear why these areas should be engaged
following target presentation with accuracy feedback only. These
apparent contradictions can be resolved when we consider that
action effects are implicitly involved also during target processing
in these previous studies, but in a relatively implicit and not
directly perceivable form. For instance, in Ruge et al. (2009), the
implicit effect associated with a left response for the target letter
‘‘N’’ in the ‘‘consonant-vowel’’ task is that the presence of a
consonant letter was correctly identiﬁed (but not the presence of
the concurrently displayed odd digit ‘‘3,’’ as would have been
indicated by the same response in case of the ‘‘odd-even’’ task).
The implicit nature of such action effects implies that the internal
representation of effects would only be (automatically) activated
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after perceiving the respective target stimulus (e.g., the consonant
letter ‘‘N’’) as a given target becomes associated with its effect
irrespective of the level of awareness with regard to this effect. By
contrast, a task cue that is not directly associated with a speciﬁc
response and a corresponding effect would not automatically
activate the task-related set of action effects unless the involved
effects are more explicitly represented. Consequently, the
rationale behind the present study was to encourage the
preparatory engagement of intentional action effect representa-
tions upon task cue presentation by making action effects more
salient and, thereby, more likely be explicitly used during cue-
based task preparation. We believe that this present study de-
signFby explicitly manipulating the type of task-related action
effectsFenables a stronger interpretation of mMFG and aIPS
activation as being related to intention-based task preparation.
By contrast, the previous studies have confounded intentional
and attentional task preparation with target- versus cue-related
processing.
Finally, another critical implication of the current results is
that they appear to broaden the notion of intentional control. In
particular, the term intentional control is often used to refer to
basic motor planning processes when a speciﬁc action and the
respective outcome are known in advance (Andersen & Cui,
2009). By contrast, in the present study, the task cue indicated the
dimension, or the set of appropriate effects (e.g., leftward or
rightward movement in the horizontal direction), to be achieved
from a set of possible actions (left or right button presses), rather
than one particular action–effect association. We speculate that
the role of the mMFG might be to internally represent these
higher level associations between action–effect associative sets,
rather than between particular actions and particular outcomes.
In this way, the intentional control system might operate hier-
archically, along a posterior–anterior axis within the lateral PFC,
with posterior regions (i.e., dPMC) representing speciﬁc action-
effect pairings, whereas more anterior regions (i.e., mMFG)
represent action–effect relationships at the set or dimensional
level. Thus, the intentional control system might be organized
analogously to the types of posterior–anterior hierarchies that
have been postulated within attentional control (e.g., Koechlin &
Summerﬁeld, 2007).
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